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IS OFFICIAL LEAGUE DATA A SAFE BET: BENEFITS AND
CONCERNS WITH REQUIRING SPORTSBOOKS TO PURCHASE
LEAGUE DATA FEEDS
Robert J. Sheran1

I. INTRODUCTION

A new gold rush began in American history on May 14, 2018 when
the United States Supreme Court invalidated the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Action (“PASPA”) in Murphy v. NCAA. 2 This
decision allowed state legislatures to permit sports betting within their
borders, essentially opening the floodgates to legalized sports betting in
America.3 Consequently, bookmakers and sports fans, not gold miners
with pick axes, are rushing in to cash out on an industry that will
generate revenues of $5.7 billion by 2024. 4 But what is creating such a
boom in this market? The answer is data. Sports data is the oil keeping
the sports betting machine running.5
The legislative landscape for sports betting data, however, remains
similar to the Wild West. With PASPA overturned, individual states with
little experience in gaming law are responsible for crafting legislation
absent federal guidance.6 Inconsistencies across state lines may place
both consumers and sportsbooks at risk. In fact, the laws surrounding
Official League Data (“OLD”) have significant repercussions on the
sports betting market.7 OLD, in this context, is a mandate requiring all
1

J.D. Candidate Class of 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law.
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85 (2018).
3 Id. (“Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it elects not to do so,
each State is free to act on its own.”).
4 VIXIO REGULATORY INTELLIGENCE, U.S. Sports‐Betting Market to Hit $5.7bn By 2024,
https://vixio.com/gamblingcompliance/insights-analysis/u-s-sports-betting-marketto-hit-5-7bn-by-2024/
2024 (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
5 James Glanz & Agustin Armendariz, When Sports Betting is Legal, the Value of
Game Data Soars, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2018, at A1 (“[D]ata has taken on that dominant role
in betting.”).
6 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484–85.
7 See Zachary Zagger, Sports Wagering Bill Is a Big Bet On Federal Oversight, LAW
360 (Dec. 20, 2018, 10:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1113700/sportswagering-bill-is-a-big-bet-on-federal-oversight.
2
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sportsbooks to use data provided by the applicable sports league.8
While this mandate presents a number of practical benefits, it is not
without its limits. Accordingly, whoever has control over this essential
element dictates how the market operates.9
This comment proposes that states should require sportsbooks to
use OLD in sports betting. Section II of this comment provides an
overview of OLD’s legislative history. OLD’s Legislative History
illustrates the differences between OLD and unofficial data and the
variations in current OLD laws. Section III details why all states should
enact laws requiring the use of OLD. First, it highlights two critical
justifications for implementing this agenda. In that light, OLD mitigates
errors when sportsbooks settle bets and prevents courtsiding. Next, it
takes notice of a potential concern—a monopoly on data—and attempts
to resolve it by defining the scope of the “commercially reasonable”
standard used in data licensing agreements. Finally, this comment
concludes that states should enact OLD laws mirroring Michigan’s
model.

II. BACKGROUND
OLD, i.e., data provided to sportsbooks by a respective league for
the purposes of betting, has been a topic of legislative debate ever since
sports betting became legal in the United States.10 Many leagues and
sportsbooks lobby state legislatures with the hopes of enacting laws
that require sportsbooks to use OLD.11 This section overviews the
history of OLD mandates, how sportsbooks use OLD, and the variations
in state laws that have adopted the mandate.
A. THE EXPANSION OF THE OLD MANDATE
Efforts to adopt a mandate requiring the use of OLD have grown
exponentially in a very short period of time. What started as an attempt

8

For purposes of this Comment, “Official League Data” is defined as any fact,
statistic, metric, analysis, result, or outcome, relating to a sports event or competition
that is obtained by the applicable sports governing body, including but not limited to a
sports league, organization, or association, or an entity expressly authorized by the
sports governing body to use or provide this information to a sports betting operator.
Infra note 62.
9 Glanz, supra note 5.
10 See, e.g., Tennessee Sports Gaming Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-302(17) (2019).
11 Zachary Zagger, NBA Signs Sports Betting Sponsorship Deal With MGM, LAW 360
(July 31, 2018, 8:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1068793/nba-signssports-betting-sponsorship-deal-with-mgm.
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by leagues to acquire “integrity fees” from sportsbooks quickly turned
into an operational necessity.12
In March of 2018, sports leagues began lobbying state legislators
with the hope of securing a one percent “integrity fee” on all bets, equal
to roughly twenty-percent of all gross gaming revenue.13 The leagues
believed it was fundamentally unfair for a sportsbook to profit from
league infrastructure without making any sort of contribution.14 The
leagues attempted to secure a royalty fee, but publicly maintained that
they were seeking a partnership to preserve the integrity of sports and
betting.15 Critics of the integrity fee saw through this veil, and
recognized any such fees were essentially a form of taxation.16 Many
feared that this “tax” would increase operation costs for legal bettors
and would cause illegal offshore sportsbooks to flourish.17 Facing
severe backlash from both the sportsbooks and state legislators, leagues
have all but abandoned this effort.18
With the prospect of integrity fees long gone, leagues shifted their
agenda to securing an OLD mandate for sportsbooks.19 OLD is an
industry term for all data related to a sport, collected by the respective
sports league, and sold to sportsbooks for betting purposes.20 Unlike
integrity fees, leagues have provided more substantive justification for
an OLD mandate. They argue that data collected and provided by
leagues are faster and more reliable than the same data collected by

12

Id.
Darren Heitner, MLB And NBA Are Testing Their Power With West Virginia’s Sports
Betting
Bill,
FORBES
(Mar.
12,
2018,
5:00
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2018/03/12/mlb-and-nba-are-testingtheir-power-with-west-virginias-sports-betting-bill/#372802c9499a.
14 Zagger, supra note 11 (“[W]e should be compensated for our intellectual property
and for our official data…”).
15 Zagger, supra note 11.
16 LEGAL
SPORTS
REPORT,
Sports
Betting
Integrity
Fee,
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/integrity-fee/ (last updated Jan. 11, 2020, 9:09
PM) (“Integrity fees . . . are basically taxes on legal sports betting”).
17 Id. (“If the cost of doing business increases for sportsbooks operating legally in
the US via integrity fees, they’ll likely attempt to pass that cost on to consumers. That
would make it more difficult for legal books to compete with offshore books that are
serving Americans illegally already.”).
18 See Steve Ruddock, How the MGM‐NBA Deal All but Ends the Integrity Fee Debate,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REPORT
(Aug.
9,
2018,
6:00
PM),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/22645/mgm-nba-integrity-fees/.
19 See
LEGAL
SPORTS
REPORT,
Official
League
Data,
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/official-league-data/ (last updated Jan. 11, 2020,
9:08 PM).
20 E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-302(17).
13
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other providers.21 In turn, the use of OLD can resolve a host of sports
betting integrity issues including inaccuracies in betting results and
“courtsiding.”22 Although true “integrity fees” are a relic of the past, OLD
shares a few key features with its predecessors.23 Leagues still believe
that sportsbooks should compensate them for data as a matter of
intellectual property rights.24 As OLD lobbying efforts continue, leagues
are entering into partnership agreements with several sportsbooks to
distribute these data feeds on their own terms.25
In August 2018, Senators Hatch and Schumer proposed the “Sports
Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018” ( “SWMIA”) to Congress; this bill
created a federal framework for sports betting and contained a
provision requiring sportsbooks to OLD .26 In response, the American
Gaming Association (“AGA”) wrote Senator Schumer on September 13,
2018, to caution him about his position on an OLD mandate.27 The AGA
characterized the mandate as an effort by federal and state legislators
to force private actors into commercial agreements with one another.28
It also forecasted that by allowing an entity to control the influx of
official data, leagues would inflate prices and monopolize their
facilities.29

21 Wayne Parry, Leagues finally cash in on sports betting by selling data, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Jan. 7, 2020), https://apnews.com/2fc27b7c558ceddd8669fb03acc15e3d
(quoting Scott Kaufman-Ross, senior vice president of fantasy and gaming for the
National Basketball Association).
22 Courtsiding denotes the activity in which someone attends a live sporting event
and disseminates real-time sports information during a broadcast delay to another for
the purposes of live and proposition betting. Ryan M. Rodenberg, John T. Holden & Asa
D. Brown, Real‐Time Sports Data and the First Amendment, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH & ARTS 63,
66–67 (2015); see also BAKERHOSTETLER, The Future of Legal Sports Gambling: What
Everyone
Needs
to
Know
About
Murphy
v.
NCAA,
3
(2018),
https://www.bakerlaw.com/webfiles/Litigation/2018/Articles/FutureLegalSportsGa
mbling.pdf; see also Glanz, supra note 5.
23 BAKERHOSTETLER, supra note 22, at 2.
24 BAKERHOSTETLER, supra note 22, at 2.
25 E.g. Zagger, supra note 11 (NBA and MGM Resorts enter into non-exclusive
partnership agreement to provide official league data).
26 See Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong., § 103(b)(5)
(2018).
27 Letter from Sara Slane, Senior Vice President of Pub. Affairs, American Gaming
Association, to Charles Schumer, Senate Democratic Leader, United States Senate (Sept.
13, 2018).
28 See id. (“Using the power of government to impose costs, eliminate operators’
market-based choices, or make it harder for consumers to bet will directly undermine
the goals we all share.”).
29 Id. (“Mandating every sportsbook contract with only one official data company
will allow individual, preferred data providers to set inflated, non-competitive
monopoly prices for their services.”).
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Congress ultimately rejected the bill, but its framework for OLD has
lived on and gained traction. Since then, three states—Illinois,
Tennessee, and Michigan—have passed laws requiring the use of OLD
in sports betting.30 Furthermore, Senator Romney, is working to revive
a federal sports betting bill, which many predict will include an official
data provision.31
B. FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OLD AND UNOFFICIAL DATA
By their definitions alone, one may assume that the distinction
between OLD and unofficial data is tantamount to splitting hairs. But
these distinctions provide OLD users with a competitive advantage over
those that do not use it. The main differences between OLD and
unofficial data are who collects the data and how sportsbooks obtain it.
But the types of data that OLD users have access to that unofficial data
users do not also plays a pivotal role.
i. How sportsbooks use sports data
The three major types of sports bets in betting legislation are: 1)
traditional; 2) live; and 3) proposition bets and current OLD laws
separate these bets into tiers.32 For purposes of this Comment, Tier 1
refers to traditional bets, Tier 2 refers to live bets, and Tier 3 refers to
proposition bets.
Traditional bets, which are based on fixed statistical odds, are
placed on the general outcome of a sporting event before the
commencement of the game.33 This includes any bet made before the
game began on the winner or on total points scored by the end of the
game.34 In contrast, live bets (also called in-play bets) are bets placed

30 Sports Wagering Act, 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. , art. 25, § 45/25-25(g) (2019); Lawful
Sports Betting Act, 2019 Mi. ALS 149 § 10(a) (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-316.
31 Tony Batt, Former U.S. Presidential Nominee Mitt Romney Working on Sports
Betting
Bill,
GAMBLING
COMPLIANCE
(Sept.
6,
2019),
https://mk0ideagrowthmd69e4g.kinstacdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/gamblingcompliance__former_u.s._presidential_nominee_mitt_romney_working_on_sports_betting_bill__2019-09-06.pdf.
32 Compare 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. art. 25, § 45/25-10 (defining a Tier 1 bet as a
traditional bet and a Tier 2 bet as a bet “that is not a [T]ier 1 [bet]”), with N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 287-I:1(XVI)-(XVIII) (2019) (defining a Tier 1 bet as a traditional bet, a Tier 2 bet
as a live bet, and Tier 3 as any other bet). But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-302(28) (listing
the different types of bets without using the tier system).
33 See How to Bet on Sports – The Different Types of Wagers, GAMBLING SITES, (last
visited
Mar.
15,
2021),
https://www.gamblingsites.com/sportsbetting/introduction/bets-wagers/ (last visited May 20, 2021).
34 See Id.
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from continuously updated statistical odds on the general outcome of a
sporting event during the progression of the event.35 This includes any
bet made after a game started, but before it is finished, on the winner or
on total points scored by the end of the game.36 Because individuals
place live bets throughout the progression of the event, the odds and
ability to bet on an occurrence changes within seconds.37 Finally, a
proposition bet is a bet on the special occurrence of an event during the
game.38 Bettors may make these types of bets before the start of the
event or during the actual progression of the event.39 Because they deal
with special occurrences, and not something as simple as the final score
of a game, proposition bets are creative and allow individuals to bet on
distinct events, such as which player will score the first point or what
time the first scored point will occur.40 In fact, some sportsbooks offer
even more creative proposition bets, like whether the coin toss will land
heads or tails, how long the pre-game national anthem will last, and
what color Gatorade players will dump on the winning coach’s head.41
But how do sportsbooks create these different types of bets? They
do so by using sports data. Mainly, sportsbooks use data for the
purposes of settling bets and making odds.42 They use this data to settle
bets by determining whether an individual placing a bet predicted
correctly on the factual outcome of an occurrence, or, more simply put,
whether the bettor won or lost their bet.43 Additionally, sportsbooks
use this data to create statistical formulas that allow them to predict the
occurrence of an event.44 One can call this probabilities odds.45 The
more data a sportsbook has access to, and the more accurate the data is,

35 What
Is In Play Sports Betting?, THE LINES (Oct.
22, 2019),
https://www.thelines.com/betting/in-play/.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 How to Bet on Sports – The Different Types of Wagers, supra note 33.
39 How to Bet on Sports – The Different Types of Wagers, supra note 33.
40 See How to Bet on Sports – The Different Types of Wagers, supra note 33.
41 Mike Rigz, 10 Ridiculous Super Bowl Prop Bets, GRIDIRON EXPERTS (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://gridironexperts.com/10-ridiculous-super-bowl-prop-bets (listing the ten most
ridiculous NFL Super Bowl Proposition Bets).
42 See 230 ILCS, art. 25, § 45/25-25(f) (“Master sports wagering licensees may use
any data source for determining the result of all tier 1 sports wagers.”); see also How to
Use Statistical Analysis When Betting on Sports, GAMBLING SITES, (last visited May 20,
2021), https://www.gamblingsites.com/sports-betting/strategy/statistical-analysis/.
43 See generally How to Use Statistical Analysis When Betting on Sports, supra note 42
(describing the various methods of statistical analyses used).
44 Betting Odds Explained – A Beginner’s Guide to Gambling, MY BETTING SITES (last
visited May 20, 2021), https://mybettingsites.co.uk/learn/betting-odds-explained/.
45 See id.

SHERAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

12/6/2021 8:22 PM

COMMENT

849

and the better informed their prediction will be—ergo, the more reliable
the odds.46
In an era of Big Data, sportsbooks have access to a wide variety of
sports data. Most sportsbooks use a combination of (1) event data, (2)
team or individual performance data, (3) proprietary and statistical or
metric data, and (4) biometric and medical data when creating bets.47
Event data encompasses all general facts and information collected
concerning the sporting event itself.48 Team or individual performance
data includes any factual information about a team’s or player’s
performance.49
Proprietary and statistical or metric data is more complex than
factual information. It is comprised of any proprietary and statistical or
algorithmic methods of analysis of raw information that may be used to
provide a competitive advantage to a team or to incorporate into a
team’s decision-making process.50 It involves simple or advanced
statistical analysis that integrates event data, team or individual
performance data, or biometric or medical data.51 Major League
Baseball (“MLB”) is one of the leading organizations that utilizes
proprietary data.52 MLB relies on “Sabermetrics,” which is an empirical
analysis that analyzes all relevant baseball information to evaluate past
and future performance.53 For example, MLB uses a Wins Above
Replacement (“WAR”) rating to determine how many wins a particular
player will contribute over the season compared to another player.54
46 Ben Burd, How Often Do Betting Odds Get It Right? THE SPORTS ECONOMIST (Feb. 22,
2021), https://thesportseconomist.com/how-often-do-betting-odds-get-it-right/.
47 William H. Williams, On the Clock, Best Bet to Draft Cyberdefensive Linemen:
Federal Regulation of Sports Betting from a Cybersecurity Perspective, 13 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 539, 545–48 (2019); Christian Frodl, Commercialisation of Sports Data, 26
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 55, 56–57 (2015).
48 See Frodl, supra note 47, at 57–58 (combining fixture data and event data). Event
data includes time of game, weather conditions, final score of game, which team won,
stadium information, etc.
49 See Frodl, supra note 47, at 58–59. Team or individual performance data includes
total number of wins/losses, points, goals, fouls, errors, assists, etc.
50 Williams, supra note 47, at 546 (combining aspects of statistical data with team
proprietary advanced statistical data analytics).
51 Williams, supra note 47, at 546.
52 See, Advanced Stats, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, (last visited May 20, 2021),
http://m.mlb.com/glossary/advanced-stats; see also A Guide to Sabermetric Research: A
Primer on Statistics, SOCIETY FOR AMERICAN BASEBALL RESEARCH, (last visited Mar. 22, 2021)
https://sabr.org/sabermetrics/statistics.
53 Advanced Stats , supra note 52.
54 Steve
Slowinski, What is WAR?, FAN GRAPHS (Feb. 15, 2010),
https://library.fangraphs.com/misc/war/; see also Wins Above Replacement (WAR),
MAJOR
LEAGUE
BASEBALL,
(last
visited
May
20,
2021),
http://m.mlb.com/glossary/advanced-stats/wins-above-replacement
(The
MLB
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Leagues may also hold proprietary data from exclusive equipment and
sports technology they own that other entities do not have access to.55
For example, the National Football League (“NFL”) tracks players’
running speed, location, and movement by inserting RFID chips into
their equipment.56 Similarly, MLB has sports technology allowing them
to track the velocity and angle players hit or throw a baseball.57 MLB
later posts this data on their online MLB StatCast system.58
Finally, an athlete’s biometric data is any measurable and
distinguishable biological, physiological, or behavioral records used to
identify an athlete including, but not limited to: height, heart rate, or
vertical jump.59 Alternatively, their medical data is any health
information or injury reports.60 Individual sports clubs and trainers
traditionally use athletes’ biometric data to monitor health and wellness
for strength and conditioning regimes.61
ii. How sportsbooks obtain sports data
Sportsbooks ultimately derive this sports data from either OLD
providers or unofficial data providers. For purposes of this Comment,
“Official League Data” is defined as:
any fact, statistic, metric, analysis, result, or outcome, relating
to a sports event or competition that is obtained by the
applicable sports governing body, including but not limited to
a sports league, organization, or association, or an entity
expressly authorized by the sports governing body to use or
provide this information to a sports betting operator.62
calculates WAR as: (The number of runs above average a player is worth in his batting,
baserunning and fielding + adjustment for position + adjustment for league + the
number of runs provided by a replacement-level player) / runs per win).
55 See Williams, supra note 47, at 545.
56 Williams, supra note 47, at 546.
57 Lara Grow & Nathaniel Grow, Protecting Big Data in the Big Leagues: Trade Secrets
in Professional Sports, 74 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1567, 1577 (2017).
58 MAJOR
LEAGUE
BASEBALL,
Statcast
Leaderboard,
http://m.mlb.com/statcast/leaderboard#avg-hit-velo,r,2019 (last visited May 20,
2021).
59 Williams, supra note 47, at 546–47; Kristy Gale, The Sports Industry’s New Power
Play: Athlete Biometric Data Domination. Who Owns it and What may be Done with it?, 6
ARIZ. ST. U. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 7, 11 (2016).
60 Williams, supra note 47, at 542–43; Gale, supra note 59, at 11.
61 Williams, supra note 47, at 546.
62 230 ILCS, art. 25, § 45/25-10; Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-51-302(17); Frodl, supra note
47,
at
55;
LAW
INSIDER,
Definition
of
Official
league
data,
https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/official-league-data (last visited May 20,
2021).
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Simply put, OLD is sports data collected by the applicable sports
body—whether it be the relevant sports league or individual team
organization, or an entity expressly authorized by these sports bodies
to collect that data.63 Currently, six major sportsbooks have partnership
agreements with professional sports organizations in the United States
to use OLD.64 For example, MLB invests an immense amount of its
resources compiling data for its StatCast system and later sells the rights
to utilize that data for creating bets to DraftKings, FanDuel, and MGM.65
Alternatively, a sports league may license the ability to collect and
distribute its data to an independent data provider who then sells this
data to a sportsbook.66 Through this agreement, authorized data
providers supply sportsbooks with an OLD feed that not only gives them
access to past and live scores, updates, and statistics but also to a system
that generates pre-game and live betting odds.67 MLB currently licenses
the ability to collect and distribute its data to sportsbooks to
“Sportradar,” which is their exclusive supplier of real-time game
statistics.68 Not only does Sportradar work with leagues and
sportsbooks to optimize their data collection systems, but their
Intelligence & Investigation Unit also uses a fraud detection system to
monitor and analyze the integrity of individual sporting events.69
Typically, authorized data providers distribute OLD feeds as
separate packages.70 The more a sportsbook pays for its OLD package,
the greater access it has to a variety of sports data sets. A real-time data
package is Sportradar’s premier OLD package, which pulls game feeds
continuously and ranges anywhere from $100,000–$2,000,000 per
month per sport.71 Premium and Standard data packages pull game
63 230 ILCS, art. 25, § 45/25-10; Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-51-302(17); Frodl, supra note
47, at 56–57; LAW INSIDER, supra note 62.
64 LEGAL SPORTS REPORT, supra note 19 (The six major sportsbooks with licensing
agreements include BetStars, Caesars, DraftKings, FanDuel, MGM, William Hill).
65 E.g., Parry, supra note 21; MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 58; Hilary Russ, Major
League Basbeall and FanDuel strike sports betting deal, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baseball-fanduel-gambling/major-leaguebaseball-and-fanduel-strike-sports-betting-deal-idUSKCN1V51WL.
66 SPORTRADAR,
League Partnerships, https://sportradar.us/about-us/leaguepartnerships/ (last visited May 20, 2021).
67 Id.
68 E.g., Id.; SPORTRADAR, supra note 66.
69 SPORTRADAR, supra note 66.
70 See
e.g.,
SPORTRADAR,
API
Packaging,
https://developer.sportradar.com/API_Packaging#Sport_packages (last visited Mar.
21, 2021); see also Matt Rybaltowski, Here’s How Much ‘Official’ League Data Actually
Costs, SPORTSHANDLE (Mar. 12, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-officialdata-cost/.
71 SPORTRADAR, supra note 70.
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feeds every three to fifteen minutes and range from $8,000–$250,000
per month per sport.72 Finally, Basic OLD packages pull game feeds once
per game and range from $500–$15,000 per month per sport.73
In contrast, unofficial data is sports data collected by any person or
entity not expressly authorized by the applicable sports body to collect
or distribute that data.74 These unauthorized “data scouts” typically
obtain this data by recording events viewed during a sports broadcast,
scraping the internet for game feeds and statistics, or courtsiding and
distributing it to sportsbooks.75 Courtsiding denotes the activity in
which someone attends a live sporting event and disseminates real-time
sports information during a broadcast delay to another for the purposes
of live and proposition betting.76 Courtsiders look to take advantage of
a broadcast delay by placing a bet on an event that already happened
before the sportsbook receives the updated data feed.77 Some compare
the practice to insider stock trading.78 Today, this issue has been most
prevalent in tennis, cricket, and basketball.79 As it stands, there is
nothing per se illegal about the methods unauthorized data scouts use
to obtain this data.80
Depending on the provider, sportsbooks may be limited in the
types of data they can access. Because unauthorized data scouts only
have access to public information recorded from broadcasts and league
websites, sportsbooks using this data are at a disadvantage compared
to those with the entirety of data a league itself provides.81

72

SPORTRADAR, supra note 70.
SPORTRADAR, supra note 70.
74 See Glanz, supra note 5.
75 See Glanz, supra note 5.
76 Ryan M. Rodenberg, John T. Holden & Asa D. Brown, Real‐Time Sports Data and
the First Amendment, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH & ARTS 63, 66–67 (2015).
77 BAKERHOSTETLER, supra note 22 at 3.
78 Tania Michaelian, Courtsiding May Become a Serious Issue Regulators Will Need to
Tackle
in
the
Future,
BETTING
USA
(July
29,
2019),
https://www.bettingusa.com/courtsiding-serious-issue/.
79 BAKERHOSTETLER, supra note 22 at 3-4.
80 BAKERHOSTETLER, supra note 22 at 4.
81 See Parry, supra note 21 (quoting several executives of the National Basketball
Association, National Hockey League, and National Association for Stock Car Auto
Racing on the advantages of OLD including NBA executive’s statement that “[t]he speed
of that data is incredibly important. We have hundreds of lead changes. You can be one
to two plays behind if you collect data off a broadcast feed. A player that hits a couple of
3-pointers can meaningfully change the odds.”).
73
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C. VARIATIONS IN CURRENT OLD LEGISLATION
While the OLD agenda is still relatively new, leagues have been
successful, in some respects, in persuading legislators to adopt it.
Nevertheless, there are major variations across each state. The most
noticeable differences include the level of involvement by state gaming
boards in implementing OLD requirements.
i. Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act
The Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018 (“SWMIA”) was
the first piece of legislation to adopt the OLD agenda.82 The failed bill
attempted to replace PASPA as a federal framework for the sports
betting market.83 Instead of preempting states from constructing their
own policies, the main goal of the bill was simply to provide a uniform
standard for ensuring the integrity of sports betting across the states.84
Its original text presented a six-year trial period requiring the use of
OLD for all sports bets made on or before December 31, 2024.85 After
this trial period, it allowed sportsbooks to forgo the OLD requirement
so long as it could show that it obtained data of similar quality from a
distributor the applicable state gaming board deemed appropriate.86
The board would only certify that this data was of similar quality to OLD
if it was “of substantially similar speed, accuracy, and consistency.”87 In
the end, the bill failed soon after it was introduced.
ii. Tennessee Sports Gaming Act
Tennessee became the first state to implement an OLD mandate
with its enactment of the Tennessee Sports Gaming Act on May 24,
2019.88 The law requires sportsbooks to “exclusively use official league
data for purposes of live betting” and obtain this data by entering into a
licensing agreement with a sports league, or authorized entity.89
Further, it allows a sportsbook to opt out of using OLD if it can
82

S. 3793, 115th Cong. §§ 1 – 502 (2018).
See id. § 2(1).
84 Schumer, Hatch Introduce Bipartisan Sports Betting Integrity Legislation, SENATE
DEMOCRATS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/schumer-hatch-introduce-bipartisan-sports-betting-integrity-legislation.
85 S. 3793 § 103(b)(5)(A)(i).
86 Id. § 103(b)(5)(A)(ii).
87 Id. § 103(b)(5)(A)(ii)(I)(aa).
88 Tennessee Sports Gambling Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-51-301 – 4-51-330; LEGAL
SPORTS REPORT, supra note 19.
89 Id. § 4-51-302(17) (Official league data must be “obtained pursuant to an
agreement with the relevant sports governing body of a sport . . . or an entity expressly
authorized . . . to provide such information to licensees for purposes of live betting”).
83
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demonstrate to the state gaming board that the sports league, or any
other authorized entity, cannot provide an OLD feed “in accordance with
commercially reasonable terms.”90 The state gaming board ultimately
defines the meaning of “commercially reasonable terms” and whether
the licensing agreement has met this threshold.91
iii. Illinois Sports Wagering Act
Soon after, Illinois enacted the Illinois Sports Wagering Act, which
legalized sports betting on June 28, 2019.92 The statute separates sports
betting into two distinct tiers.93 Tier 1 encompasses traditional sports
bets placed before the event and determined solely by the final score or
outcome.94 Tier 2 encompasses any other sports bet that does not fit in
Tier 1, including live bets and proposition bets.95 Illinois requires the
use of OLD for Tier 2 but not Tier 1 bets.96
The Illinois law provides a greater degree of state intervention in
the licensing of OLD for sports betting. It requires sports leagues or
entities authorized to provide OLD to apply for a data provider license
given by the State.97 The sports league, or authorized entity, must then
pay a licensing fee to the State, calculated as a certain percentage of the
data sold to the sportsbook.98 After the sportsbook decides it wants to
offer Tier 2 betting and negotiates a deal to buy an OLD feed from the
sports league, the league may notify the state gaming board that it
wishes to supply the data to the sportsbook.99 Within 30 days of the
league notifying the board, the sportsbook must begin to use the OLD
for Tier 2 bets unless the contract’s terms are not “commercially
reasonable.”100 If the state gaming board determines the terms are not
“commercially reasonable,” the sportsbook may use any data it desires
for Tier 2 bets.101

90

Id. § 4-51-316.
Id.
92 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/25-25(a) (2020).
93 Id. 45/25-10.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. 45/25-25(f)–(g).
97 Id. 45/25-60(a)–(c).
98 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/25-60(c).
99 Id. 45/25-25(g).
100 Although the legislators require “commercially reasonable terms” they do not
explicitly indicate what is meant by this term. Id.
101 Id.
91
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iv. Michigan Lawful Sports Betting Act
The state of Michigan created arguably the most comprehensive
framework for OLD with its enactment of the Lawful Sports Betting Act
on December 20, 2019.102 The statute requires the use of OLD for Tier
2 live sports betting.103 Similar to the Illinois Sports Wagering Act,
sports leagues must notify the state of their desire to provide OLD,
prompting sportsbooks to begin using OLD within sixty days.104 Again,
if a sportsbook can demonstrate to the state gaming board that the
league will not provide OLD on “commercially reasonable terms,” the
sportsbook can use any data feed that the board has approved.105 The
law conveniently provides a nonexclusive list of factors the state gaming
board may consider when evaluating whether leagues are offering OLD
on “commercially reasonable terms.”106 It includes:
(i) The availability of a sports governing body’s [T]ier 2 sports
bet official league data to a sports betting operator for more
than [one] authorized source.
(ii) Market information regarding the purchase by operators
of data from any authorized source including sports governing
bodies or their designees for the purpose of settling sports
[bets], for use in this state or other jurisdictions.
(iii) The nature and quantity of data, including the quality and
complexity of the process used for collecting the data.
(iv) The extent to which sports governing bodies or their
designees have made data used to settle [T]ier 2 sports bets
available to operators.107
In the event of a challenge to the commercial reasonableness of the
licensing terms, the state gaming board must make a determination
within 120 days, during which time the sportsbook may use any source
of approved data.108
v. New Hampshire Sports Betting Law
New Hampshire provides perhaps the most lenient standard for
OLD in sportsbooks. New Hampshire enacted their sports betting law

102
103
104
105
106
107
108

2019 Mi. ALS 149 (2019).
Id. at § 10a(1)–(4).
Id. at § 10a(3).
Id. at § 10a(3)(a)-(b).
Id. at § 10a(3)(b).
Id. at § 10a(3)(b)(i)-(iv)
2019 Mi. ALS 149 § 10a(4).
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within their preexisting lottery commission, on July 12, 2019.109
Although making no specific mention of OLD, it does require
sportsbooks to “publicly disclose the source of the data that will be used
to determine the outcome of a [T]ier II or [T]ier III wager[s]” instead of
outright requiring it.110 The fact that this law, and perhaps other state
sports betting laws, deliberately leaves out a disclosure requirement on
traditional bets may infer that there is only a necessity for OLD for live
and proposition betting.

III. ANALYSIS
States should adopt laws requiring the use of OLD in sportsbooks.
OLD is an effective solution to two core issues that sportsbooks struggle
with—consistently settling bets and preventing courtsiding. It would
be ill-advised to say, however, that this mandate is without its concerns.
The most relevant of these includes a potential monopoly on sports data.
While many fear that leagues and authorized data providers will
leverage their positions in the betting market to control the influx of
data, current OLD laws already attempt to combat this by imposing a
“commercially reasonable” standard. With some careful adjustments to
these provisions, state gaming boards and courts can ensure that
leagues are unable to refuse to deal the data necessary for sportsbooks
to operate. Ultimately, legislators, gaming boards, and courts must
begin treating OLD as an essential facility that leagues are required to
provide upon “commercially reasonable terms”.
This section begins by emphasizing the practical benefits of OLD.
Its focus then shifts to addressing what courts and gaming boards must
do to avoid a potential monopoly on OLD. Finally, it proposes a model
framework that all state legislators should replicate when enacting or
amending their own laws.
A. PRACTICAL BENEFITS OF IMPLEMENTING AN OLD MANDATE
Lobbyists promote OLD as the fastest and most accurate sports
data on the market. Consequently, sportsbooks can use OLD as a
practical means to address two major issues facing the sports betting
industry today. Currently, sportsbooks struggle with consistently
settling their bets with other sportsbooks and preventing courtsiding.111
109

RSA Tit. XXIV, ch. 287-I (2019).
Id. at § 11.
111 See Craig Mauger, Pro leagues score with Michigan’s new sports betting law,
DETROIT
NEWS
(Jan.
7,
2020),
110
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i. OLD prevents inconsistent betting results across sportsbooks
When real money is at stake, individuals want to be confident that
sportsbooks will settle their bets fairly and accurately. If an individual
makes a bet on the Yankees to win, they expect that the sportsbook will
pay them if the Yankees, in fact, do win. If they make a bet on Gleyber
Torres to hit two singles before the sixth inning, they expect that the
sportsbook will pay them if he does, in fact, hit two singles before the
sixth inning. Similarly, sportsbooks want to be confident that the data
they use to create odds are accurate to avoid faulty predictions,
consequently causing them to lose money. If a sportsbook receives data
stating that the Yankees win fifty percent of the time they play the Red
Sox, this will severely distort their odds if they actually win seventy
percent of the time they play the Red Sox. For these concerns,
proponents claim that OLD is the one true source of accurate sports data
because it contains the official ruling and recordation of both public and
nonpublic information as it occurs in real time.112
In a hearing before the Kansas legislature last year, MLB’s Senior
Vice President, Bryan Seeley, addressed this issue head on.113 He
indicated that two people placing identical bets with separate
sportsbooks could receive different outcomes, depending on which data
source the sportsbook decided to use to settle the bet.114 As Seeley
highlights, the issue is settling bets based on the outcome of smaller, less
significant, plays that are more prone to inconsistent rulings where a

https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/01/07/pro-sportsleagues-scored-michigans-sports-betting-law/2805358001/
(quoting
Joel
Schuchmann, PGA Tour vice president of communications (“[OLD] helps ensure that all
consumers receive the same results for their bets”); see also David Purdum, How NBA
sparked the American sports gambling gold rush, ESPN (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/25145786/why-nba-other-professionalleagues-jumping-sports-gambling (quoting National Basketball Association (“NBA”)
vice president and head of fantasy and gaming Scott Kaufman-Ross (“What happens is if
you have unofficial data that is collected off the broadcast and then distributed, the
broadcasts are delayed and so the data feed is delayed”)).
112 LEGAL SPORTS REPORT, supra note 19 (quoting Dan Spillane, NBA Executive, during
an in-person testimony); see also Letter from Dan Spillane, Senior Vice President,
National Basketball Association, to New York Senate Standing Committee on Racing,
Gaming, and Wagering (May 8, 2019).
113 Brett Smiley, Opinion: The War Over Sports Betting Data: Lies, Half‐Truths and
Statistics: Part I, SPORTSHANDLE (July 17, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/sportsbetting-data-war-analysis-part-one/ (alluding to the legislative hearing before the
Kansas Legislature on legalized sports gambling).
114 Id. (“Two people placing the exact same bet with different bookmakers could
receive different outcomes, simply based on which data the bookmaker is using to settle
in-game wagers.”).
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sportsbook must make a judgment call.115 For example, on a close play
in baseball, one sportsbook may record the play as a hit where the other
records it as an error.116 This would be detrimental for two individuals
making the same proposition or live bet on the total number of hits in a
game with different sportsbooks.117
Seeley made sure to refer to this issue in the context of live and
proposition bets instead of traditional bets where there are minimal
circumstances where a sportsbook cannot retrieve the correct final
score or outcome of an event.118 The following reference to golf is a
helpful clarification of this point. Surely, there is no difficulty in using
Google or turning on the television to see that Tiger Woods won the
2019 PGA Master’s Tournament to settle a traditional bet.119 Andy
Levinson, a senior vice president with the PGA Tour, sees the necessity
for OLD when making bets during the event or on a specific occurrence
like an individual putt or drive.120 There are over 30,000 shots in a golf
tournament requiring data providers to collect multiple data points at
once, like ball distance and location.121 Levinson and other supporters
of OLD conclude that leagues and authorized data providers with
significant investment in sports technology are the only entities that can
achieve this.122 This is possibly why every single state thus far only
requires OLD for live or proposition bets but never for traditional
bets.123
Those that believe an unofficial data provider can wait for the
official ruling or fact-check the play against a league’s official box scoring
make two critical assumptions.124 First, this assumes that every league
will make a public ruling on each individual play and then decide to
publish it on their website. A league may not publish the distance of
115

Id. (analyzing inconsistencies in unofficial data in terms of “batted ball[s]” and
“errors” occurring throughout a game as opposed to the final outcome).
116 Id. (“Imagine some operators marking a batted ball as a hit and others scoring it
as an error, followed by a cascading series of bets reliant on that original subjective
outcome.”).
117 Id.
118 See id.
119 PGA
TOUR,
The
Masters:
Past
Winners
&
Runners‐up,
https://www.pgatour.com/tournaments/masters-tournament/past-winners-andrunners-up.html (last visited May 20, 2021).
120 Parry, supra note 21 (quoting Scott Kaufman-Ross, senior vice president of
fantasy and gaming for the National Basketball Association).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See e.g., 230 ILCS, art. 25, § 45/25-25(f)–(g); Tenn. Code Ann. §4-51-302(17);
2019 Mi. ALS 149 § 10a(1)–(4); see also RSA Tit. XXIV, ch. 287-I, § 11.
124 Smiley, supra note 113 (“[Unofficial data provers] may simply look at box scores
that appear on MLB.com, NBA.com . . .”).
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every single homerun or individual golf swing by every player. Second,
this also assumes that sportsbooks and individuals placing bets are
willing to wait while the unofficial data source fact-checks individual
rulings on each play. Bettors are impulsive and odds made for live bets
change every second.125 Having to wait for an unofficial fact-check
seems like an inefficient way to ensure data accuracy where the market
already proposes a better solution.
The small risk that a state gaming boards will take disciplinary
action for incorrectly settling bets is likely not enough to entice those
sportsbooks using unofficial data to self-regulate.126 When an individual
loses a bet due to discrepancies in data, he may decide to file a complaint
with the sportsbook or a state gaming board in the most extreme of
circumstances. This assumes that an individual who placed ten dollars
on a bet he won, but was not awarded for, wants to file a complaint with
the state gaming board against the sportsbook. Multiply that by another
fifty thousand people who also placed that bet but refuse to file a
complaint for ten dollars. In that case, the sportsbook would have
cheated its customers out of a total of $500,000. In fact, a little over one
year ago a representative at FanDuel Sportsbook incorrectly calculated
the odds of a NFL game using unofficial data.127 One individual placed a
$110 live bet that paid out to $82,600.128 Initially, the sportsbook
refused to pay out the money to any bettors, citing that their “house
rules” exculpated them of this error.129 After a parade of public
backlash, FanDuel eventually decided to pay.130 While this may seem
like a small misstep for a sports betting giant like FanDuel, it is
detrimental to midsized and smaller sportsbooks using unofficial data.
Ultimately, refusing to impose any standard on the use of data could
allow sportsbooks to take risks at the expense of its consumers.
ii. OLD inhibits the practice of courtsiding
When it comes to the transmission of data in sports betting, every
second counts. Odds change continuously throughout an event and they
change after every play in live betting.131 The NBA, in particular, has
four statisticians per game with industrial grade laptops that transmit

125

THE LINES, supra note 35.
Smiley, supra note 113 (“[I]f there still is a variant outcome . . . . [a] customer will
take it out on the sportsbook”).
127 Rybaltowski, supra note 70.
128 Rybaltowski, supra note 70.
129 Rybaltowski, supra note 70.
130 Rybaltowski, supra note 70.
131 See GAMBLING SITES, supra note 33.
126

SHERAN (DO NOT DELETE)

860

12/6/2021 8:22 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:3

data outside of each stadium over a high-speed server.132 Data
providers transmit OLD in less than a second.133 To compare,
sportsbooks can receive OLD three seconds faster than they can receive
unofficial data.134 For unofficial data providers that collect the data from
television broadcasts or online streaming services, this delay gap grows
anywhere from fifteen seconds to one minute.135
While this difference in the transmission of data may appear
facially insignificant, it ultimately determines the value of live betting
platforms.136 Scott Kaufman-Ross, senior vice president and head of
fantasy and gaming with the NBA, highlighted that in professional
basketball there are hundreds of lead changes.137 A sportsbook
obtaining unofficial data scraped off broadcast feeds may be a few plays
behind, which could distort the accuracy of live betting odds.138 In
response, some sportsbooks choose to suspend their live betting to
account for the delays in data transmission.139 This means that these
sportsbooks offer twenty percent less live bets than a sportsbook using
OLD does.140
Above all else, sportsbooks that take advantage of the speediness
of OLD can ultimately use it to combat courtsiders.141 As earlier defined,
courtsiding is the activity in which someone attends a live sporting
event and disseminates real-time sports information during a broadcast

132

Purdum, supra note 111.
Craig Mauger, Pro leagues score with Michigan’s new sports betting law, DETROIT
NEWS
(Jan.
7,
2020),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/01/07/pro-sportsleagues-scored-michigans-sports-betting-law/2805358001/ (quoting Chris Dougan,
chief communications officer for Genius Sports Group).
134 LEGAL SPORTS REPORT, supra note 19.
135 Jacob Feldman, Why Online Streams Still Lag Behind Live TV – and What to Do
About It, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.si.com/techmedia/2018/10/25/live-streaming-internet-tv-lagging-delay-explanation-fix-future
(citing the fluctuations in delay time between live sports action, television broadcasts,
and online streaming services).
136 Nic Couchman, Faster than a Tweet – the Reasons Behind the Soaring Value of Live
Data,
SPORTS
BUSINESS
(Oct.
10,
2019),
https://www.sportbusiness.com/2019/10/faster-than-a-tweet-the-reasons-behindthe-soaring-value-of-live-data/ (“[I]n ‘in-play’ betting in particular, real time data has
become ‘the difference between a product having value and no value at all.’”).
137 Parry, supra note 21.
138 Parry, supra note 21.
139 Purdum, supra note 111.
140 Purdum, supra note 111.
141 Rodenberg, supra note 76, at 65–67 (reasoning that some sports leagues
distribute their data to protect their investments and compete with third-party
disseminators of data, or courtsiders).
133
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delay to another for the purposes of live and proposition betting.142
Courtsiders look to take advantage of a broadcast delay by placing a bet
on an event that already happened before the sportsbook receives the
updated data feed.143 Today, this issue is most prevalent in tennis,
cricket, and basketball, and devastates the integrity of sports within
both the United States and internationally.144 After incidents of severe
corruption at the Australian Open, the country of Victoria made it a
crime, punishable up to ten years, to engage in courtsiding.145 Unlike
some of the international markets, however, the United States has been
unable to prohibit courtsiding without implicating First Amendment
freedom of speech issues.146 While private sports leagues may prohibit
the activity from their venue, federal and state governments have
provided almost no protection to sportsbooks and leagues.147 The
inherently immoral activity is not justified simply because it is legal in
the United States.
The most important question is whether a sportsbook can obtain
and process game data faster than a courtsider can tweet or text the
outcome of a play.148 In most circumstances, broadcast delays prevent
sportsbooks that use scraped unofficial data from doing so.149
Therefore, sportsbooks should be inclined to utilize the speediness of
OLD. The OLD mandate provides a greater level of protection for
sportsbooks to combat courtsiders. In turn, this preserves the integrity
of the sports betting market. As Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban
expressed in an email to ESPN, “if the data is real time, no one has an
advantage over someone else.”150
B. FRAMEWORK FOR AVOIDING A POTENTIAL MONOPOLY ON DATA
The major challenge of an OLD mandate is “like electricity in a city,
oxygen in a submarine or rubber at a tire factory, whoever controls the
crucial element determines how the entire system works.”151 Without
142

Rodenberg, supra note 76, at 65–67.
Rodenberg, supra note 76, at 65–67.
144 BAKERHOSTETLER, supra note 22; see also Tania Michaelian, Courtsiding May
Become a Serious Issue Regulators Will Need to Tackle in the Future, BETTING USA (July 29,
2019), https://www.bettingusa.com/courtsiding-serious-issue/.
145 Crimes Amendment (Sports Integrity) Act, No. 20 (2013).
146 Rodenberg, supra note 76, at 96–101, Table 1 (outlining the scenarios in which
the First Amendment would likely apply to the dissemination of real-time sports data).
147 Rodenberg, supra note 76, at 96–101; see also Michaelian, supra note 144.
148 See Couchman, supra note 136; Purdum, supra note 111.
149 See generally, Couchman, supra note 136; Purdum, supra note 111.
150 Purdum, supra note 111 (quoting Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban).
151 Glanz, supra note 5.
143
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data, a sportsbook cannot operate. In a scenario where leagues and
authorized entities control the influx of data, these entities ultimately
retain the power to fix prices and restrict access to the element
sportsbooks revolve around.152 Consequently, requiring sportsbooks to
obtain OLD from one or numerous sources creates a monopoly on
data.153 As the value of live betting continues to soar, what stops leagues
or authorized data providers from drastically increasing their prices or
outright refusing to deal OLD?
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a federal statute that protects
trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies.154
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act makes it a felony for a person or
entity to monopolize any trade or commerce.155 Refusals to deal, which
may in some circumstances constitute a restraint in trade, remain one
of the most unsettled areas of antitrust law.156 A refusal to deal occurs
when a monopolist uses its power in one market to monopolize another
market by refusing to do business with a competitor or refusing to sell
a product or service to another without a legitimate business reason for
doing so.157 While an entity may generally choose whom it does
business with, it must tread lightly when refusing to deal if it hopes to
avoid antitrust liability under the Sherman Act.158
As it stands today, there are limited antitrust theories available for
victims of refusals to deal.159 Arguably, the most remedial antitrust
principle for sportsbooks who fall victim to a refusal to deal is the
essential facilities doctrine.160
152 Eric Ramsey, “Data Monopoly” Key to Leagues’ Desired Control Over US Sports
Betting,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REPORT
(Mar.
22,
2018,
1:15
PM),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/19047/data-monopoly-key-to-leaguescontrolling-sports-betting/.
153 Id.
154 15 U.S.C. Ch. 1 §§1–38 (1890) (hereinafter “Sherman Antitrust Act”); THE 100TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 136 Cong Rec S 10137, Vol. 136, No. 94 (“The Sherman
Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving
free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.”).
155 Id. at § 2.
156 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Refusal to Deal, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/refusal-deal
(last visited May 20, 2021).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–13.
160 Id. at §§ 1–2 (annotations).
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i. Treating OLD as an Essential Facility
Treating OLD as an essential facility to sports betting that must be
accessible upon commercially reasonable terms, will prevent a sports
league or authorized data provider from refusing to deal it. Generally,
companies are under no obligation to share their data under antitrust
laws but in narrow circumstances, refusals to deal can result in
violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.161 The essential facilities
doctrine requires a monopolist in control of an essential facility to make
such a facility available on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.162
The purpose of the essential facilities doctrine is to prevent the
monopolist from extending their monopoly power from one market to
another.163 The doctrine was established by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
(AT&T).164 The elements of the essential facilities doctrine are “(1)
control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s
inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3)
the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility
of providing the facility.”165 Over time, the essential facilities doctrine
has proven to be an effective framework for preventing monopoly
powers from extending into relevant markets and will be invaluable for
sportsbooks acquiring OLD.166
In the event a sports league or authorized entity refuses to deal
OLD, a sportsbook should notify the applicable state gaming board, who
would decide to relieve the sportsbook of its obligation to use OLD, and
possibly consider raising the issue to the state’s Department of Justice.
For the claim of refusing to deal an essential facility to be successful, the
state gaming board, and subsequently the Department of Justice, would
have to find that: (1) the applicable sports league or authorized entity is
a monopolist controlling an essential facility; (2) the sportsbook cannot
reasonably duplicate the essential facility; (3) the sports league or entity
is not currently providing the sportsbook access to the essential facility;

161 Norman W. Hawker, Open Windows: The Essential Facilities Doctrine and
Microsoft, 25 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 115, 121 (1999) (citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (quotations omitted)).
162 Id. (citations omitted).
163 Id. (citations omitted).
164 MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (7th Cir.
1983) (citations omitted).
165 Id.
166 See e.g., Hawker, supra note 161, at 122–28; see also MCI Commc’ns Corp., 708 F.2d
at 1132–1133; Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1088
(D.C. Cir. 1998); Delaware & H. R. Co. v. Conrail, 902 F.2d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 1990).
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and (4) it is feasible for the sports league or entity to give the sportsbook
access to the facility.167
1. Sports leagues are monopolists in control of an essential
facility
To prove that a sports league or authorized entity is a monopolist
in control of an essential facility, a state gaming board would have to
answer (1) whether OLD in sports betting constitutes a facility; (2)
whether the sports league or authorized entity has a monopoly in the
sports betting market; and (3) whether OLD in sports betting
constitutes an essential facility.168
First, it is plausible to acknowledge that OLD constitutes a facility.
Courts have found that, for purposes of the doctrine, the term “facility”
extends to both tangible and intangible property.169 Although data is
intangible, the distribution of OLD is no less of a facility than the
distribution of cable services, electricity, or cellular roaming data that
courts characterize as facilities under the doctrine.170
Second, sports leagues and their authorized entities quite literally
have a monopoly under OLD laws. A monopoly power is the ability to
exclude competition from or fix prices in that specific market.171 Here,
state governments impose obligations on sportsbooks that prevent
them in certain instances from buying data from any supplier other than
the applicable sports league or authorized provider.172 The Federal
Trade Commission refers to this as a requirement contract, or exclusive
dealing.173 Although these agreements do not inherently violate
167

MCI Commc’ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1133.
See Hawker, supra note 161, at 129.
169 See e.g., MCI Commc’ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1133 (applying the doctrine to
interconnections of local cable services and facilities); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (applying the doctrine to the distribution of electric power);
Advanced Health Care Services, Inc. v. Radford Community Hospital, 910 F.2d 139, 150–
151 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying the doctrine to medical vendor requests for access to
patients); Sunshine Cellular v. Vanguard Cellular Systems, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 486, 497–
98 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying the doctrine to a data roaming agreement).
170 See id.
171 Morris Commc’n Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1293–1295 (citing United
States v. E.I. du Ponte de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)).
172 See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/25-25(f)–(g) (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-316
(2021); 2019 - 4916 Mich. Adv. Legis. Serv. 149 § 10a(1)–(4) (LexisNexis).
173 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Exclusive Dealing or Requirements Contracts,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrustlaws/dealings-supply-chain/exclusive-dealing-or (last visited Mar. 7, 2021; LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
Exclusive
Dealing
Arrangement,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/exclusive_dealing_arrangement (last visited Mar. 9,
2021).
168
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antitrust law, they may constitute impermissible monopolizations
under certain circumstances. These few entities essentially become the
gatekeepers for distributing data and potentially decide who may
operate in a downstream market.174 There are even instances of data
monopolization in states without OLD laws currently in place. In fact,
Sportradar’s president, Matteo Monteverdi, recently revealed that his
company holds ninety percent of New Jersey’s market share for sports
betting data.175
Finally, OLD is essential to sports betting. For purposes of the
doctrine, “essential” means that denial of access to the facility caused
more than an inconvenience or slight economic loss.176 Instead, it must
have caused a severe handicap.177 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that a facility is “essential” if control over it designates a power to
eliminate competition in another market.178 If a state requires the use
of OLD, then denial of it would be detrimental to the complete operation
of a sportsbook. Without it, a sportsbook cannot legally function.179
OLD is not just essential to sports betting, it is obligatory. Again, as the
gatekeepers of OLD, leagues have the power to pick and choose which
sportsbooks they do business with, giving them control over who may
operate in states that require OLD.
2. Sportsbooks cannot reasonably duplicate OLD
The second element of the doctrine requires a competitor’s
inability to duplicate the essential facility.180 Certainly, if an entity had
the ability to duplicate a facility it would not be considered
“essential”.181 This does not mean that the facility must be impossible
to duplicate in a literal sense.182 The test is whether it is practically or
174 See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/25-25(f)–(g) (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-316
(2021); 2019 - 4916 Mich. Adv. Legis. Serv. 149 § 10a(1)–(4) (LexisNexis).
175 Matt Rybaltowski, As Offshore Books Operate Unchecked, Demand for Sports
Betting Data Knows No Boundaries. That’s An Issue, SPORTSHANDLE (MAR. 19, 2019),
https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-data-distribution-offshore-sportsbooks/.
176 Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1990).
177 Id. at 569.
178 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991); see
also Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc. v. Giles Mem’l Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 488, 498 (W.D.
Va. 1944).
179 See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/25-25(f)–(g) (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-316
(2021); 2019 - 4916 Mich. Adv. Legis. Serv. 149 § 10a(1)–(4) (LexisNexis).
180 MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th
Cir. 1983).
181 Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating
that an essential facility is “one for which there is no feasible alternative”).
182 See Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 179 (2d Cir.
1990) (implying that literal duplication is not required if it “would be [] impractical and
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economically feasible for the competitor to duplicate the essential
facility.183 Here, sportsbooks would meet even the higher threshold of
literal inability to duplicate if they are legally required to use it; a
sportsbook duplicating data through scraping or courtsiding would be
violating state law.
3. Sports leagues have refused to deal OLD
The third and perhaps most important element in terms of an
essential facilities claim is that the monopolist denied a competitor
access to use the essential facility. While an unequivocal refusal to deal
is enough to satisfy this requirement, it is not necessary.184 Instead, one
need only show that the monopolist “refus[ed] to provide access on
reasonable, nondiscriminatory terms.”185
Here, two scenarios are possible. In one instance, a league’s
commissioner may randomly decide that they do not want anyone
compromising the integrity of their sport by “gambling” and
subsequently cut off the entire supply of data to the betting market. In
professional sports, this cause of action is less likely to occur since most
leagues have embraced sports betting as a way to keep fans engaged
with the sport.186 For collegiate sports, however, this fear may seem
more realistic with efforts to protect vulnerable student athletes from
corruption.187
The more likely scenario is that leagues will decide to raise the
prices of their OLD feeds to an exorbitant rate to the point where it
amounts to an outright refusal to deal. The key principle to this claim is
access on “reasonable terms”.188 State legislators are tailoring their OLD
laws to include provisions that require sports leagues to provide their

unreasonable” to do) (quoting Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 724 F.
Supp. 1073, 1079 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
183 Directory Sales Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606, 612 (6th Cir. 1987)
(“[I]t is sufficient if duplication of the facility would be economically infeasible.”)
(quoting Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); Sunshine
Cellular v. Vanguard Cellular Sys., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 486, 497–98 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[T]he
plaintiff must merely demonstrate that ‘duplication of the facility would be economically
infeasible.’”) (quoting Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d.
Cir. 1990)).
184 Hawker, supra note 161, at 138 (citing Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics
of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433, 456 (1987)).
185 Hawker, supra note 161, at 138 (citations omitted).
186 See Ramsey, supra note 152.
187 See Ramsey, supra note 152.
188 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991);
see also Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc. v. Giles Mem’l Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 488, 498
(W.D. Va. 1944).

SHERAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

12/6/2021 8:22 PM

COMMENT

867

data on “commercially reasonable terms.”189 The concern is that none
of these laws sufficiently define what “commercially reasonable terms”
really means.190 The term “commercially reasonable efforts” is
considered the least demanding standard of effort behind “reasonable
efforts” and “best efforts.”191 The commercial standard simply instructs
courts to ask whether it makes sense from a business, economic, or
efficiency standard to make the entity do something.192 At the same
time, a business does not have to adhere to a provision, even if it is
possible or reasonable to do so, as long as it is not reasonable in an
economic sense.193
Currently, state legislators and gaming boards do not have a firm
understanding of how OLD is collected, processed, and transmitted from
leagues to data providers to sportsbooks. Such an understanding is
necessary to determine what is “commercially reasonable” from a
business, economic, or efficiency standard. With such a vague standard
that fails to highlight what gaming boards should look for when
determining if OLD terms are “commercially reasonable,” it is easy for
leagues to create unreasonable OLD agreements and enforce their terms
because it is economically feasible. In turn, these take-it-or-leave-it
agreements place sportsbooks at the mercy of the leagues.
The Michigan Lawful Sports Betting Act provides the most
guidance on how gaming boards and courts assess whether OLD is
offered on “commercially reasonable terms.”194 Michigan legislators
provide factors to consider, such as: the complexity of the data collection
process, the nature and quantity of data, and the relevant market
information regarding purchases of OLD.195 As gaming boards begin to
develop and understand the processes of transmitting data to
sportsbooks, this critical element of the essential facilities doctrine will
be easier to apply. For now, the guidelines set forth by Michigan provide
the best direction for determining whether sports leagues have refused
to deal OLD.

189 230 ILCS 45, art. 25, § 25–25(f)–(g); Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-51-316; 2019 Mi. ALS
149 § 10a(1)–(4).
190 See id.
191 Chambliss, Bahner & Stophel, P.C., Best Efforts or Reasonable Efforts? – How Legal
Efforts
Standards
Can
Affect
You,
JDSUPRA
(June
28,
2013),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/best-efforts-or-reasonable-efforts-ho-22497/.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 2019 Mi. ALS 149 § 10a(3)(b).
195 Id.
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4. It is feasible for sports leagues to give access to OLD
The final element of the doctrine asks whether it is feasible for the
monopolist to give access to the essential facility.196 Even if it is feasible,
a monopolist may still refuse to deal with the facility if it has a valid
business justification for doing so.197 Monopolists are not expected to
go to extraordinary measures that make minimal commercial sense to
provide its competition with a facility.198 For example, if the monopolist
is working with limited resources to supply the facility, or if the facility
itself is limited, the monopolist is not required to stop what it is doing to
make it available to others.199
The question of practical feasibility is rarely in dispute. Leagues
are not concerned with sending data feeds to those who pay fair price
for it. No complaints are made about providing the data, as long as it
goes through the right channels.200 In fact, leagues actually encourage
sportsbooks to purchase OLD from them because it is a faster and more
reliable process.201 Additionally, distributing OLD is feasible because it
is not a limited or finite resource like gas or oil. Data can be used and
reused over and over again without limitation. Once the leagues have
the data, there is no concern that their supply will run out.
Presumably, leagues would be more inclined to raise a valid
business justification defense. Leagues may contend that they are
limiting access to OLD to prevent sportsbooks from freeriding off their
investment and to receive proper compensation for their “intellectual
property”.202 Freeriding essentially means obtaining a benefit from
another’s investment without proper compensation.203 Leagues assert
that all sportsbooks should compensate them for OLD because they are

196 MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T), 708 F.2d
1081, 1133 (7th Cir. 1984).
197 See Hect v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992–93 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[T]he
antitrust laws do not require that an essential facility be shared if such sharing would
be impractical or would inhibit the defendant’s ability to serve its customers
adequately.”) (footnote omitted).
198 See Anaheim v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1992).
199 Id.
200 E.g., Zagger, supra note 11.
201 Parry, supra note 21.
202 Ethan Sanders, Aalok Sharma, Stinson LLP, Who’s On First? – The Fight Over Official
Sports
Data
After
Murphy,
JDSUPRA
(Mar.
12,
2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/who-s-on-first-the-fight-over-official-81726/
(citing Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1040) (“Sports leagues, who assert ownership over sports data as intellectual
property, worry that sports betting platforms that use the data without compensation
undermine the value of the leagues themselves.”).
203 Id.
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essentially building an entire market off the leagues’ success.204 Without
sports leagues, there would be no sports betting. This contention,
however, is both misguided and unsupported by case law.
Three famous sports data cases illustrate that leagues would likely
fail in raising this defense: Morris Commc’ns. Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., N.B.A
v. Motorola, Inc., and C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced, L.P.205 Morris introduces a permissible, yet limited, case of
refusal to deal sports data to prevent freeriding.206 Whereas, Motorola
and CBC constrain the business justification defense to certain types of
sports data only.207
In Morris, the court dismissed a communications company’s claim
that the PGA Tour violated the Sherman Act for monopolizing the
publication of its real-time golf scores.208 The PGA had created a
proprietary tool called Real-Time Scoring System (“RTSS”) that
collected golf scores from its tours and posted them on its website.209
Because it is physically impossible for an individual to follow every
player in the tour at once, the PGA assigned groups of workers to follow
golfers during tournaments and record scores at the end of each hole.210
These PGA recorders sent the scores immediately to a remote
production truck that disseminated it to on-site media centers as live
golf scores.211 The PGA also had a policy prohibiting fans and other
individuals (aside from the PGA score recorders) from using cell phones
and other recording technology.212 This made the RTSS the only source
of tournament scores and the PGA’s media center the only location to
obtain these scores.213 To access the PGA’s media center to view the
scores, entities had to agree to the PGA’s terms and conditions, which
included an On-Line Service Regulation (“OLSR”).214 The OLSR
prohibited media companies from publishing the scores until thirty
minutes after the actual live golf play or until the PGA posted the final

204

See id.
Morris Commc’ns Corp., v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004);
N.B.A. v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 855 (2nd Cir. 1997); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major
League Baseball Advanced, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 2007).
206 See Morris Commc’ns Corp., 364 F.3d at 1293–95.
207 See Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d at 846–47; C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 822.
208 Morris Commc’ns Corp., 364 F.3d at 1288.
209 Id. at 1290–91.
210 Id. at 91.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Morris Commc’ns Corp., 365 F.3d at 1290.
205
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scores later on its website.215 It also prohibited these organizations
from later selling or broadcasting the compiled scores to others without
buying a license from the PGA to do so.216
Morris Communications, a media company, sued the PGA claiming
that its OLSR violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act for monopolizing the
sale of the compiled golf scores and related sports information.217 The
Eleventh Circuit held that PGA did not violate Section 2 of the Sherman
Act by requiring media companies to purchase golf scores because it had
a valid business justification of preventing media companies from
freeriding off its proprietary technology.218 The court found that the
scores and data were a derivative product of PGA’s proprietary RTSS
system.219 The court reasoned that the effort, money, and time spent by
the PGA to create this proprietary product justified the restriction of
access to its data without proper compensation.220 Under this theory of
freeriding, Morris could not demand access to PGA’s proprietary
product for free just so it could turn around and sell it to others for
payment.221
In Motorola, the court lifted a permanent injunction placed on
Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Systems (“STATS”) and Motorola,
Inc. that prohibited the sale of pagers that provide updated statistics and
scores of NBA games during live play without the NBA’s authorization
to disseminate such information.222 Here, Motorola and STATS created
a paging device called SportsTrax that displayed (1) the teams’ names,
(2) scoring updates, (3) who possessed the ball, (4) free-throw play
moments, (5) the game quarter, and (6) the time remaining in live NBA
games as they were played.223 The system obtained this information
from a data feed provided by STATS.224 STATS representatives viewed
games on television or listened to games on the radio and recorded
updates on their computers.225 They relayed these updates to a host
computer that collected, analyzed, and reformatted the information
then retransmitted it to individual pagers.226 Consumers subsequently
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1295–96.
Id. at 1296.
Morris Commc’ns Corp., 365 F.3d at 1298.
Id.
N.B.A v. Motorola, Inc, 105 F.3d 841, 855 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 843–44.
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id.
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received the updates approximately two minutes after the game.227 The
NBA then developed an identical product to SportsTrax called
Gamestats.228
The NBA brought suit alleging federal copyright infringement of its
data but the court dismissed the claim holding that neither the
underlying sports game nor the facts collected from its broadcast invoke
copyright protections under the Copyright Act of 1976.229 For an
underlying event to be copyrightable, it must be an “original work of
authorship” like a movie, play, or musical, that is fixed in a “tangible
medium of expression.”230 Furthermore, it is a longstanding principle
that facts and ideas are not forms of expression shielded by copyright
law.231 Here, the underlying NBA game and individual plays were not
originals work of authorship because they were neither fixed nor
scripted.232 While NBA teams have game plans and use playbooks, the
individual plays often change and the natural flow of the game makes it
so that games and player performance are no longer “authored.”233
In CBC, the court affirmed its declaration that the seller of fantasy
sports products was entitled to use information about baseball players
in its products.234 CBC was an online fantasy baseball platform that
allowed individuals to simulate owning and managing a major league
baseball team.235 Individuals paid CBC to join and manage actual players
throughout the real season.236 The simulated players and their statistics
were comprised of the actual names and performances of the real
players that CBC licensed from MLB.237 After CBC’s license with the MLB
to use player “names, nicknames, likenesses, signatures, pictures,
playing records, and/or biographical data” expired, the MLB entered
into an exclusive contract to license these rights to Advanced Media.238
In anticipation of litigation, CBC sought the courts’ judgment to
determine a First Amendment right to use this information without the

227

Id.
N.B.A., 105 F.3d at 853.
229 Id. at 845–47 (citing Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.S. §§ 101-1401, 102(a) (1976)).
230 Id. at 846–47.
231 Id. at 847 (citing Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service, Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350
(1991) (quoting Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 547–48 (1985))).
232 Id. at 846–47.
233 Id. at 847.
234 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 825
(8th Cir. 2007).
235 Id. at 820–21.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
228
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MLB’s authorization.239 The MLB Players Association joined the suit and
counterclaimed that CBC violated the player’s state law right of
publicity.240
The Players Association ultimately satisfied the requirements of
the right of publicity claim but, nevertheless, CBC’s First Amendment
rights preempted this.241 Alongside literal speech, the First Amendment
protects many expressive mediums of public value including artworks,
musical creations, and stories.242 All of the information used in CBC’s
platform was readily available in the public domain.243 Furthermore,
CBC’s creation of fantasy simulations was a form of expressive artwork
because they were constructing something entirely new with
information gathered from the league.244 The outcome may have been
different if CBC was spitting back the information and not creating
something original, such as a fantasy sport platform. Accordingly, CBC’s
licensed sports information is also an expression of speech protected by
the First Amendment.245
In light of these cases, it is unlikely that either justification of
preventing freeriding off OLD or safeguarding a league’s intellectual
property will succeed. The prevention of freeriding is limited to
instances where entities take leagues’ data free of charge and profit
from it.246 If entities want data that only leagues have access to, they
must properly compensate them.247 OLD laws already reflect this.
These laws do not require leagues to give away their OLD for free.248
Instead, they still give the leagues commercial autonomy to enter into,
and negotiate the terms of agreement for a “commercially reasonable”
price.249 Without proper compensation, sports leagues can refuse to
deal in order to protect their investments in data collection.250
This does not extend to a league’s effort to protect their seemingly
nonexistent “intellectual property.” This term is used sparingly because

239

Id.
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 820–21.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 819.
243 Id. at 821.
244 Id. at 820-21.
245 Id. at 821.
246 See Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc , 364 F.3d 1288, 1295-98 (11th Cir.
2004).
247 Id.
248 See 230 ILCS, art. 25-25(f)–(g); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-316; 2019 Mi. ALS 149 §
10a(1)–(4).
249 Id.
250 See Morris Commc’ns Corp, 364 F.3d at 1295–98.
240
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a league’s collection of sports data is not technically “intellectual
property.”251 As Motorola illustrates, sports data compiled of raw facts
are not copyrightable because they are not original works of authorship.
252 Like the system SportsTrax, sportsbooks use general sports facts and
statistics to create bets.253 To settle a bet, a sportsbook needs to
research the factual outcome of an event.254 For both traditional bets
and live bets, this means using event data and performance data to settle
the bet.255 This slightly differs in terms of proposition bets. A
proposition bet about a factual occurrence, such as the score at half-time
or number of goals scored by a player, invokes no intellectual property
protection.256 Proposition bets on proprietary data or biometric data,
however, may invoke some level of intellectual property protection.257
Sportsbooks allow proposition bets on a player’s W.A.R. rating, or other
sabermetric, originating from the MLB StatCast System’s calculation of
a proprietary algorithm.258 Similarly, sportsbooks will offer proposition
bets on an athlete’s biometric data in the future, as the Alliance of
American Football and MGM had planned.259 A complex algorithm
created by representatives of a sports league or the genetic makeup of
an athlete constitutes an original form of authorship more than fact
driven statistics, like the final score of game.260 Ironically, sportsbooks
use of OLD to create odds and provide bets probably constitutes an
“original work of authorship”, like the fantasy sports platform in CBC.261
Creating odds involves compiling and analyzing data using complex
regression systems.262 Sportsbooks use OLD to create entirely new
metrics that ironically invoke more copyright protection than the
factual sports data itself.
251

See N.B.A v. Motorola, Inc, 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2nd Cir. 1997).
Id. at 847.
253 See THE LINES, supra note 35.
254 See generally GAMBLING SITES, supra note 33; THE LINES, supra note 35.
255 See generally GAMBLING SITES, supra note 33; THE LINES, supra note 35.
256 See Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d at 847 (holding that sports facts are not
copyrightable); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced, L.P., 505 F.3d
818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the First Amendment protects use of factual
information available to the public).
257 See Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1295-98 (11th Cir.
2004) (supporting the idea that sports leagues may monopolize data to prevent freeriding off their significant investments).
258 See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 54.
259 Darren Rovell, Alliance of American Football will have Enhances In‐Game Betting,
ESPN (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/24632798/allianceamerican-football-enhanced-live-game-betting.
260 See Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d at 846–47; C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 821.
261 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 821.
262 See generally, GAMBLING SITES, supra note 42.
252
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In conclusion, leagues would have little success defending their
monopoly of OLD. The essential facilities doctrine provides sportsbooks
with an avenue to obtain OLD on reasonable terms and seek redress
when leagues refuse to deal.
C. Crafting Model OLD Legislation
Current OLD legislation is on the right track to help stimulate the
growth and prosperity of the new sports betting market. In light of the
previous discussion, there are a few factors legislators should consider
when enacting or amending their OLD laws.
Ultimately, it does not necessarily matter where the sports data
originates as long as it is accurate, reliable, and fast. Legislators choose
OLD because it is the only source of data proven to fulfill all three
requirements.263 In today’s global tech market, it is foolish to believe
that leagues will remain the only proficient provider of data to
sportsbooks. SWMIA predicted as much when it added in an OLD trial
period provision.264
Going forward, legislators should require
sportsbooks in every state to impose an OLD trial period. Individual
gaming boards could determine the length of this trial period until their
representatives feel comfortable establishing a system that qualifies
sources of unofficial data as being “of substantially similar speed,
accuracy, and consistency” to OLD.265 In doing so, gaming boards could
consider: market research reports published by gaming agencies such
as the AGA; comparable OLD standards; and the capabilities of
authorized data providers.266 Legislators should also require each data
provider, whether official or unofficial, to obtain a license from the state
gaming board permitting them to distribute data to a sportsbook in their
state, as Illinois does.267 Likewise, sportsbooks should clearly indicate
on their platform where they obtain their data, in order to notify
consumers whether they use OLD or unofficial data.268
The benefits of OLD are clear. In terms of the transmission of
sports data, mitigating discrepancies in results and stopping courtsiding
are of the utmost importance. Legislators may also prevent attempts by
leagues or data providers to monopolize OLD by tightening their
263

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-302(17) (2021).
Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 103(b)(5)
(2018).
265 Id.
266 See
Research
&
Resources,
AM.
GAMING
ASS’N,
https://www.americangaming.org/research/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2021); SPORTRADAR,
supra note 66.
267 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 25 § 60(a)-(c) (LexisNexis 2020).
268 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287-I:11 (LexisNexis 2020).
264
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respective obligations to provide data on “commercially reasonable
terms.”269 “Commercially reasonable” provisions are currently too
ambiguous to provide sportsbooks with true protection against refusals
to deal and unreasonable pricing.270 Leagues may exploit this vague
standard or even collude with one another to manipulate state gaming
boards into believing their arbitrary pricing structures are “reasonable.”
Michigan provides the best protection against this. Their law provides
a nonexclusive list of factors other states should incorporate:
(i) The availability of a sports governing body’s tier 2 sports
bet official league data to a sports betting operator for more
than [one] authorized source.
(ii) Market information regarding the purchase by operators
of data from any authorized source including sports governing
bodies or their designees for the purpose of settling sports
wagers, for use in this state or other jurisdictions.
(iii) The nature and quantity of data, including the quality and
complexity of the process used for collecting the data.
(iv) The extent to which sports governing bodies or their
designees have made data used to settle tier 2 sports bets
available to operators.271
When considering these factors, gaming boards should focus
mainly on the capability and cost differences between collecting OLD
and unofficial data. If a sportsbook could obtain unofficial data of a
similar quality to OLD at a lower price, there is no reason a league should
be allowed to upcharge their data because it bears the label “official.”
Following the Michigan model, a gaming board should make a
determination of an OLD agreement’s “commercial reasonableness”
within 120 days.272 During this time, the sportsbook may use any source
of approved data.273 Every state should adopt these key provisions to
ensure integrity within the sports betting market.

269 See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 25 / § 25(f)–(g); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-316 (2021);
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 432.410a (LexisNexis 2020).
270 Current provisions do not provide a standard to determine what constitutes as
“commercially reasonable terms.” See e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 25 / § 25(f)–(g); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 4-51-316 (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 432.410a (LexisNexis 2020).
271 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 432.410a (1)-(4) (LexisNexis 2020).
272 Id.
273 Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As sports betting has evolved in the United States, so has the
mandate requiring the use of OLD. As it stands, OLD is a practical means
to mitigate discrepancies in results across sportsbooks and to prevent
courtsiding. Without it, both of these issues will remain a constant
threat to consumers, sportsbooks, and the integrity of the market.
Notwithstanding, the OLD mandate is not without attendant concerns.
Current legislation does not account for the growing capabilities of
unofficial data collection that may prove just as proficient as OLD.274 It
also remains too vague in some of its key provisions and will allow
leagues to extend their monopoly power over sports data.275 As a
solution, state legislators should incorporate OLD trial periods that
allow state gaming boards to adjust to the utilization of sports data on
betting platforms. This will help identify when unofficial data may
become an acceptable alternative.276 They should also adopt the
Michigan model that lists out a set of nonexclusive factors to determine
whether OLD agreements were entered into upon “commercially
reasonable terms.”277 The future of the sports betting market in the
United States is bright. It will remain prosperous if all states adopt OLD
mandates.

274 See generally, 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 25 / §§ 5-99 (LexisNexis 2020); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-51-301-07 (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 432.401-19 (LexisNexis 2020);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287-I:11 (LexisNexis 2020); Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act
of 2018, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 103(b)(5) (2018).
275 See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 25 / § 25(f)–(g); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-51-316; MICH.
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 432.410a (1)-(4) (LexisNexis 2020).
276 See Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, S. 3793, 115th Cong. §
103(b)(5) (2018) (utilizing a trial period during which time a state gaming board may
determine the sufficiency of certain sports data).
277 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 432.410a (1)-(4) (LexisNexis 2020).

